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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review an order of
the Utah Industrial Commission pursuant to §35-1-86 Utah Code Ann.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This

is

an

appeal

for

review

of

an

Order

of

the

Utah

Industrial Commission.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented for review on appeal are as follows:
i.

Whether or not the Industrial Commission
committed error by failing to construe the
workers' compensation statute liberally in
favor of the applicant.
3

ii.

Is the Industrial Commission's decision and
order supported by adequate findings of fact
and conclusions of law.

iii.

Whether or not the Industrial Commission erred
in finding that the Applicant's medical
condition was not work related.

iv.

Whether the petitioner's due process rights
have been denied by virtue of the Commission
taking too long to make it's findings of fact.

v.

Whether the petitioner's due process rights
have been denied by virtue of the Commission's
Findings of Fact or if they are arbitrarily
capricious or wholly without cause.

vi.

Whether the Industrial Commission applied the
proper standard of review when entertaining
Applicant's Motion for Review.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
PAGE NO.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-86
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99
Utah Code Ann. §63-43b-12
Utah Code Ann. §63-43b-16
Utah Code Ann. §63.43b-17
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12 states as follows:
(6)(c)

The order on review shall contain:

(i) a designation of the statute or rule
permitting or requiring review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues
reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or
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agency is to be affirmed, reversed, or modified, and
whether all or any portion of the adjudicative proceeding
is to be remanded;
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative
reconsideration or judicial review available to aggrieved
parties; and
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or
review.
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 states as follows:
(4)

The appellate court shall grant relief only iff on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced
by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which
the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its
face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction
conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the
law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or
decision-making process, or has failed to follow
prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to
disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of
the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the
agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice,
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by
giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair
and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-17 states as follows:
(l)(a) In either the review of informal adjudicative
proceedings by the district court or the review of formal
adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may
award damages or compensation only to the extent expressly
authorized by statute.
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(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as
required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency
action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further
proceedings.
(2)
Decisions of petitions for judicial review of final
agency action are reviewable by a higher court, if authorized
by statute.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-86 states as follows:
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse, or
annul any order of the commission, or to suspend or delay the
operation or execution of any order.
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 states as follows:
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and
the dependents of each such employee who is liked, by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment, wherever
such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely selfinflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on
account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical,
nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of
death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this
chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment of
medical nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and
funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the
employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee.
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99 states, in part as follows:
(1) If an employee claiming to have suffered an industrial
accident in the service of his employer fails to give written
notice within 180 calendar days to his employer or the
commission of the time and place where the accident and injury
occurred, and of the nature of the accident and injury, the
employee's claim for benefits under this chapter is wholly
barred.
STATEMENT OF CASE
On July 15, 1991, the Petitioner asserts she was injured on
the job while in the course and scope of her employment.

On

December 31, 1991, the Petitioner filed an Application for Hearing
6

for her Industrial Accident claim with the Industrial Commission.
The

petitioner

was

claimed

that

her

on-the-job

activities,

including washing dishesf lifting trays and an increased workload
led

to an

injury

to her

shoulder.

Defendant

responded

that

Petitioner's medical condition is directly attributable to a preexisting condition and not attributable to an industrial accident
or disease.
A hearing was held on June 12, 1992. After hearing testimony
and receiving a medical exhibit, the Administrative Law Judge
(hereinafter

ALJ) took the matter

under

advisement.

letters were sent to the ALJ requesting a decision.

Several

On November

20, 1992, (or 162 days post hearing) the Administrative Law Judge
entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.
ALJ

The

found that applicant had problems with her right arm and

shoulder. That applicant knew the workers compensation system very
well having prior industrially related injuries, ie cut finger and
back.

That the applicant was released to return to work on

November 4, 1991. That applicant admitted she told her supervisor
that she suffered from arthritis. The ALJ found that the applicant
and her witnesses were not credible witnesses and that the defense
witnesses were more credible.

The ALJ found that there is no

connection between the applicant's shoulder problem and the alleged
industrial accident.
The

applicant

filed

a Motion

Hearing on December 21, 1992.

for Review and Request

for

The Industrial Commission entered

it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law indicating there is
7

substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's findings on
credibility.

That there is evidence that applicant complained of

shoulder and arm pain on July 15, 1991 and left work to seek
medical attention.

That the applicant suffered symptoms prior to

the alleged incident of July 15, 1991.

That the incident was not

immediately reported to the employer and that applicant's treating
physician attributed her complaints to a recurrent condition for
which she sought treatment.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The Applicant asserts she is entitled to workers compensation
benefits for having suffered an industrial injury on July 15, 1991
while in the course and scope of her employment.

Immediately

following the incident, she confronted her supervisor, Greg Coburn,
and indicated she needed medical attention.

In the hearing, Mr.

Coburn testified that she was in pain, that she was crying, and
that she was on the job when she confronted him.

See pages 123,

130 of Transcript. Mr. Coburn further testified that the applicant
needed immediate medical attention.
Another witness and employee of defendant, Penny Manchester,
also saw applicant in tears on the day of the accident and verified
she needed medical treatment.

An accident report regarding the

industrial injury was filled out by a supervisor on July 15, 1991.
See report.
Applicant was immediately treated for her injury by Dr. David
Curtis, a physician who is employed by Defendant.
8

In his chart

note August 8, 1991, Dr. Curtis indicates that applicant reported
that the injury was industrially related.

Dr. Curtis did not fill

out a Physicians Report of Injury even though he was apprised that
the medical condition was industrially related.
An arthrogram was performed after the injury and found that
she had a torn rotator cuff.

Surgery was performed

14 days

following the injury and the findings showed "an obvious large tear
of the rotator cuff".

No prior medical report manifests a torn

rotator cuff.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission mis-applied the standard for review
when entering it's Findings of Factf Conclusions of Law and Order
denying Motion for Review. Specifically, the Industrial Commission
applied Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g) which is the standard the
Court of Appeals must use.

The Industrial Commission must apply

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12 for the Motion for Review.

It indicates

that the Industrial Commission order shall contain the following:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule
permitting or requiring review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues
reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or
agency is to be affirmed, reversed, or modified, and
whether all or any portion of the adjudicative proceeding
is to be remanded;
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative
reconsideration or judicial review available to aggrieved
parties; and
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or
review.
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The Industrial Commission did not follow Utah Code Ann. §6346b-12.

It mis-applied the standard of review, by not entering

proper Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law for each issue, by not
indicating the proper disposition of the case, and by disregarding
substantial evidence indicating a compensable accident.
The Industrial Commission disregarded competent evidence in
favor

of

unsubstantial

contradictory

evidence

in finding

Applicant did not suffer a compensable injury.

that

The Industrial

Commission committed an error of law by when it placed too much
emphasis

on

"credibility"

benefits

in

favor

of

when

it

should

compensability.

have

McPhie

construed
v*

the

Industrial

Commission, 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977).
The Applicant was substantially prejudiced by the delay of a
decision by the ALJ.

The ALJ tended to use superfluous evidence

and disregarded substantial evidence in Applicant's favor. The ALJ
took an inordinate amount of time to decide the case, and then only
after prodding by the applicant.
have been violated.

Applicant's due process rights

She is entitled to an ALJ who is unbiased.

Her due process rights have been violated when the ALJ's conduct
prevented meaningful and impartial consideration of the evidence.
Bunnell

v.

Industrial

Commission,

740 P.2d

1331

(Utah

1987).

Anderson v. Industrial Commission, 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985).
Conclusions of Law are not supported by the facts.
ALJ

nor

the

Commission

meaningful review.

entered

adequate

Findings

The

Neither the
to

base

a

Finally, the Commission and the ALJ did not

construe the facts in favor of compensability.
10

McPhie.

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
PROPER STANDARD FOR REVIEW
The Industrial Commission mis-applied the standard of review.
The Industrial Commission relied on Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g)
when it indicated that"
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
("UAPA"), an ALJ's findings of fact will be
sustained if the findings are supported by
"substantial evidence when viewed in light of
the whole record before the court."
The Industrial Commission went on to say:
In its discussion of review of agency fact
finding, the court noted that it would "not
substitute
its judgment as between
two
reasonable conflicting views," even if the
court may have reached a different conclusions
had the matter come before them on de novo
review. Citing Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of
Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Ut. Appl. 1989).
This case is identical to Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission,
215 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (1993).

In Ashcroft, like this case, the

Industrial Commission employed the phrase "substantial evidence"
when reviewing the ALJ's decision.

The Court of Appeals found in

Ashcroft that "This is not the correct standard".
prove

compensability,

evidence" must be used.

the

standard

of

That in order to

"preponderance

of

the

Jd. at 50.

There is a significant distinction between "preponderance of
evidence"

and

"substantial

evidence"

and

is not

one

of

mere

phraseology. Id..

Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence

as

mind

a

reasonable

conclusion".
App. 1989).

might

accept

as

adequate

to

support

a

Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Ct.
The Ashcroft case was remanded back to the Industrial
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Commission.

This

case

should

also be remanded

as both Mrs.

Featherstone and the Court of Appeals are "entitled to know that
the proof was evaluated under the correct standard". Jd. at 51.
THE FINDINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE
An

administrative

agency must make

findings

of

fact

and

conclusions of law that are adequately detailed so as to permit
meaningful appellate review. Adams v. Board of Review, 173 Utah
Adv. Rep. 18 (1991).

The failure of an agency to make adequate

findings of fact on material issues renders its findings "arbitrary
and capricious". Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 300, 335
(Utah App. 1990) cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).
Supreme

Court

has

clearly

described

the

detail

The Utah

required

administrative findings in order to be considered adequate.

in
See

Adams at page 19. Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986).
In this case, the Industrial Commission merely summarized the
medical records by stating that the injured employee "had a history
of

shoulder

pain

prior

to

July

15, 1991".

That

Dr.

Green

attributed the rotator cuff injury to the July 15, 1991 industrial
incident.

That Dr. Curtis made reference to

"recurrent right

shoulder pain" and "applicant believed her injury was associated to
'more heavy work 7 ".
testimony.

The Industrial Commission then summarized the

Even though a summary may be helpful, the Adams court

specified that "A mere summary of the conflicting evidence in this
case therefore does not give a clear indication of the ALJ's or the
Commission's view as to what in fact occurred.
12

CREDIBILITY
Credibility

has

been

a major

source

of

concern

at

the

Industrial Commission level. The Commission is now realizing that
to merely decide a case based solely on credibility does not meet
Constitutional

muster.

Ordinarily,

the

Commission

and

the

reviewing Court accord great deference to the Administrative Law
Judge.

The policy of deference is predicated

on the Judge's

ability to personally observe the witness and evaluate first hand
his

or

her

demeanor.

Although

determination

of

a

witness

credibility is usually left to the discretion of the finder of
fact, that discretion is not unlimited and can be abused.

How easy

it would be for an ALJ to summarily dismiss a case based solely on
credibility knowing that the Commission or the Court of Appeals
would have an impossible task of ruling otherwise.

However, said

abuse should be scrutinized carefully by this court.

A judge is

not at liberty, under the guise of passing upon credibility of a
witness, to disregard his testimony when from no reasonable point
of view is it open to doubt.

Witnesses

81 Am Jur 2d §1034.

Moreover, there is no reason for a trier of fact to determine the
credibility

of

the

testimony

of

a

party

where

it

is

not

contradicted by direct evidence, or by any legitimate inferences
from the evidence, and it is not opposed to the probabilities, or
in its nature surprising or suspicious.
In this case, the ALJ chose insignificant and often irrelevant
facts to illustrate his preconceived belief that the Applicant and
all her witnesses lacked credibility.
13

The ALJ made the simple

finding that "Considering all the foregoing, the Administrative Law
Judge finds that the applicant is not a credible witness". The ALJ
justifies

his

summarizing

testimony

that

applicant

told

a

supervisor that she had arthritis, that pain prevented her from
working, that she applied for unemployment benefits, that she knew
the workers compensation system well, that she had prior problems
with her right arm and shoulder and that she chose to retire.

The

ALJ completely ignored testimony and facts that 1) there was an
increased workload, 2) that applicant performed her duties well up
to the date of the injury, 3) that her supervisor found her in
intense and immediate pain, 4) that her supervisor indicated she
needed immediate medical treatment and 5) there is now a torn
rotator cuff when previously there was not.
It should be realized that the industrial injury occurred
close to one year previous.

The Applicant has seen numerous

doctors, underwent a battery of tests and was intimidated by her
employer and employer's doctor.

It is not remarkable, and in fact,

is entirely natural and consistent that her memory may have some
minor gaps.
In Baker v. Industrial Commission, 405 P.2d 613 (Utah 1965)
the Utah Supreme Court had its first occasion to comment directly
on the use of credibility determinations in workers' compensation
cases.

In

that

case, the

Industrial

Commission

had

denied

compensation, sustaining an Administrative Law Judge's denial of
benefits

on

credibility.

the

basis

of

the

Applicant's

alleged

lack

of

The Supreme Court in reversing, held in part as
14

follows:
We believe that the Commission as a fact
finder acted as it did because apparently it
disbelieved
uncontroverted
testimony
of
witnesses whose interest was in no way shown
or inferablef which carried a reasonable
measure of conviction, and there was noting in
the record which intrinsically would discredit
the testimony or be indicative of witness
demeanor that would give the Commission an
advantage over the Court in its determination.
The Commission's Order recited testimony of
the Applicant which seems to be taken out of
contextf without considering the record as a
whole.
We think that the critical question here is
whether
the
Commission
arbitrarily
can
discount
all
competentf
uncontradicted
evidence. We think it can't, but did so here,
calling for reversal.
There is no lack of evidence or anything in
the record to reflect incredibility on the
part of the Applicant or her witnesses,
unless,
on
uncontroverted
testimony
we
arbitrarily say six persons, under penalty of
perjury, were all prevaricators.
The Baker Court noted that the purpose of the Industrial
Compensation Act was to alleviate hardships upon workers and their
families, and that the facts and inferences therefrom constituting
a worker's right to recover are to be liberally construed and went
on to hold that allegations of incredibility "must at least be
supported by the record and by accurate findings of fact". 615.
See also McPhie.
PRIOR INJURIES
The ALJ indicated that the applicant had a previous history of
injuries.

This

is undisputed

and was

Applicant.

In order to recover workers compensation benefits, an

15

fully

divulged

by

the

employee must prove that she was injured "by accident arising out
of or in the course of employment" Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45.

There

are two prerequisites for a finding of a compensable injury 1) The
injury

must

be

"by

connection between

accident"

and

2) there must

be

the injury and the employment.

Industrial Commission, 146 Utah Adv. Rep. 53 (1990).

a

causal

Nvrehn v.
The mere fact

that an applicant has a pre-existing condition does not prevent
that applicant from recovering benefits.

The cases are clear that

"The aggravation or lighting up of a preexisting disease by an
industrial

accident

is

compensable.

Allen

Commission, 729 P. 2d 15 (Utah 1986) at 25.

v.

Industrial

The key question is

whether given this body and this exertion, the exertion in fact
contributed to the injury.

The Commission must make detailed

analysis as to legal and medical causation.

None of this was ever

done by the Commission and this matter should be remanded back to
the Commission for appropriate findings.

In Nyrehn, like in this

case, the Court of Appeals found that:
The factual findings of the Commission are silent as to
whether Nyrehn's preexisting back condition contributed
to the industrial injury. The ALJ had merely concluded
as a matter of law that 'since Ms. Nyrehn brought a
preexisting low back condition to the workplace,' the
Allen test applied. Implicit in such a legal conclusion
is the critical factual finding that Nyrehn's preexisitng
condition contributed to her injury.
Such material
findings, however, may not be implied. In order for us
to meaningfully review the findings of the Commission,
the findings must be sufficiently detailed and include
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached. Id at 55.
TIMELY REPORTING
16

The legislature has indicated what is needed when reporting an
injury.

In Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99, it indicates what is necessary

to notify the employer.
of the injury.

The employee must notify within 180 days

The employer then has the obligation to notify the

Industrial Commission.

The employee can also notify her doctor.

The doctor then notifies the Industrial Commission.

You will note

that neither the employer, nor the doctor notified the Industrial
Commission

appropriately.

In this

case, the

supervisor

was

immediately apprised of the injury when he personally witnessed the
applicant

in

tears

and

that

she

need

medical

supervisor filled out the report on that day.

treatment.

A

Another supervisor

filled out another report within 54 days of the date of accident.
Just because the ALJ chose to accept the last supervisor as the
reporting incident cannot bar a claim.
NO WITNESSES
An injured worker does not always have the privilege to have
someone witness an accident.

The mere fact that an injury is

unwitnessed does not mean it is not compensable.

Moreover, there

is medical verification by her employer that she was injured.

All

witnesses indicated that they noticed Applicant crying and in need
of medical attention while she was on the job.
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
In Adams v. Board of Review, 173 Utah Adv. Rep. 18. (1991) the
Court of Appeals found that "An administrative agency must make
findings

of

fact

and

conclusions

of

law

that

are

detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review".
17

adequately
The Court

then cited Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah App.
1990) when it stated:
In order for us to meaningfully review the
findings of the Commission, the findings must
be "sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusions on each factual
issue was reached. The failure of an agency
to make adequate findings of fact on material
issues renders it findings "arbitrary and
capricious".
There

are

two

compensable injury.
Green

indicated

employment.
applicant
second

facets

to

determine

whether

The first is medical causation.

that her medical condition

there

is

a

Renowned Dr.

is related

to her

Dr. Curtis, the defendant's employee, indicates that

attributes her condition to increase workload.

facet

is

legal

causation.

Neither

Commission analyzed this aspect in any depth.

the

ALJ

The

nor

the

The failure to make

adequate findings renders the decision arbitrary and capricious.
Nyrehn.

The

Court

of

Appeals

cannot

review

the

record

meaningfully.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should remand this matter back to the
Industrial Commission for further hearing.
Dated this

day of July, 1#93.

/

/

'•IX
DkviS W. Parker
Attorney for Appellant
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